

BRICS

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
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Letter from the Chair

Welcome to the BRICS committee at WAMUNC XXVIII. I am Braedan Murphy and I am excited to be your chair for our upcoming conference. Some information about me, I am a freshman at GW's Elliot School of International Affairs studying International Affairs concentrating in International Economics and a second major in Economics. Academically I am interested in international politics, macroeconomic policy, and modern history. I have done Model UN since my sophomore year of high school and I have previously worked on the staff of GWCIA, GW's middle school conference. Outside of MUN I am an associate editor for the Elliot School's international affairs journal The Globe, outreach team member for the Alexander Hamilton Society, and I play the baritone saxophone for the GW Jazz Orchestra. Also, being from New England I enjoy skiing in my free time.

Over the past two decades BRICS has evolved substantially into a significant political force, marking a major shift in the international order. It is likely that our debate on this topic will grow increasingly relevant as emerging economies like those of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa begin to rival the West. Through this committee you will be able to explore this emerging shift in global power that may very well define the next generation of international relations.

It should be made abundantly clear that respect is a priority at WAMUNC and any form of discrimination based on identity, whether racism, sexism, or otherwise, will not be tolerated. Even as some positions in our committee might have some views on gender, sexuality, or race that differ from the US, it will be no excuse for any written or spoken material that targets, disrespects, or harms another delegate, culture, or country.

If you have any questions or wish to submit a position paper (which are not required by the conference but are personally recommended to help prepare for debate) please email me at

[Braedanm@gwmail.gwu.edu](mailto:braedanm@gwmail.gwu.edu). **You must CC your advisor in all emails sent to me**, otherwise I cannot reply directly and I cannot guarantee that you will receive a response in a timely manner (it also makes my life harder so please CC your advisor).

I am excited to see you all explore this topic, whether through your preliminary research or by expanding upon democratic backsliding and AI governance through debate in committee. These nuanced and topical debates should make for a fun and engaging weekend. Good luck with your preparation and I look forward to seeing you all in March!

Best,

Braedan Murphy



Introduction

Since its inception in 2009, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) has steadily been on the rise as one of the most influential blocs outside of the traditional Western-led order. When taken in combination with BRICS+ members (Indonesia, UAE, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia), the coalition represents 44% of global GDP and 54% of the world's population.¹ In recent years, BRICS has positioned itself as the primary forum through which emerging powers can enact favorable reform to international institutions and enhance cooperation amongst emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs). For the West, the rise of BRICS has signaled the uncomfortable progression of a multipolar world order, one in which power is distributed between multiple actors with significant economic and military capabilities.² The past decade has been particularly eventful, with BRICS' ambitions stretching beyond mere economic cooperation, increasingly engaging in discussions on key issues like international development, geopolitical alignment, and energy security. As a steadily expanding organization, BRICS has recently grown to include non-voting "partner countries" such as Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.

Outside of the main political organization, BRICS includes the New Development Bank (NDB). Developed as an alternative to the Western-backed International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, the NDB uses equal loans from member states to expand affordable capital and support development programs that promote long-term resilience and less reliance on the West.³ One of the NDBs crowning achievements has been the Contingency Reserve Agreement (CRA), providing liquid funds for economies in strain, with China providing the most funding. Planned

¹ "About the BRICS." *BRICS Brasil*, <https://brics.br/en/about-the-brics>.

² "What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding?" *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brics-group-and-why-it-expanding>

³ "New Development Bank." *BRICS Brasil*, <https://brics.br/en/about-the-brics/new-development-bank>

economic cooperation goes beyond the NDB, however, and includes plans to develop a shared BRICS currency.⁴ The NDB is an important signal to the West that large scale global development financial institutions, often a projection of soft power in the international theater, can no longer be monopolized.

Despite its massive influence and seemingly unstoppable growth, the alliance has been riddled with deep internal problems. The bloc brings together countries with diverse political systems and foreign policy priorities, raising questions as to whether the alliance will ever exercise the same level of cooperation as other groups such as the G7.

Historical Background

The term BRIC was initially coined by British economist Jim O'Neill, who saw the foremost emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa as holding the potential to challenge the existing world economic and political order. An informal meeting in 2006 was the first attempt at political cooperation among this specific group, and by 2009 annual summits were created as formal, organized meetings for this new political association.⁵ For years to come BRICS staggered as a chaotic and ill-defined grouping of nations who held vastly differing interests, making their summits better at grabbing attention than asserting an influential political force. The 2017 summit in Xiamen China can be seen as a transition away from this informality, producing a policy statement outlining clear, unifying goals and treating BRICS as a true organization rather than a loosely affiliated international club.⁶ Since then, BRICS has expanded its members as a part of BRICS+ as previously mentioned and its most

⁴ "Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement." *University of Toronto*, <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-treaty.html>

⁵ "BRICS: Sources of Information" *Library of Congress Guides*, <https://guides.loc.gov/brics>

⁶ "BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration" *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, https://web.archive.org/web/20190420024533/https://www.brics2017.org/english/documents/summit/201709/t20170908_2021.html

recent summit has been treated with relative interest as BRICS begins to look more like a serious alliance and competition to the West. There remains a lot to be done if BRICS is going to obtain equal footing with the Western world order: member states remain politically dissimilar and many are still reliant on Western markets, institutions, and political relationships which prevent cutting ties outright with BRICS competition. Still, the economic weight and political presence of BRICS has undoubtedly grown with no signs of stopping anytime soon.

BRICS is not the first attempt towards a multipolar global order, and while it is not the formal continuation of any previous multilateral effort to bring developing countries to the table of world governance it shares many similarities with the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) during the Cold War. Much of the values that form the foundation of BRICS—multipolarity, non-interventionism, anti-colonialism—can be seen as inspired by this initial resistance to the bipolar world governed by the US and Soviet Union. This is important because NAM held particular values that may be challenged by BRICS members which would mark a departure from the initial rhetoric of the coalition. Notably, NAM was adverse to military or defense pacts and pursued non-interference and neutrality during the Cold War which holds implications for any attempt to centralize power, militarily or politically, among BRICS nations.⁷

Topic 1. Global Governance Reform and Democratic Backsliding

The world is a very different place than it was just a decade ago, and that applies particularly to the role of democracy in global governance. The prevalence of liberal democracies has diminished greatly from its peak at the fall of the Soviet Union. Whether looking at GDP, population, or territory, the breadth of liberal democracies has receded leaving a

⁷ “From Bandung to BRICS: Two Styles One Objective” América Latin en Movimiento, https://www.alainet.org/en/articulo/170350?utm_source=chatgpt.com

vacuum for autocratic regimes to once again return to the forefront of global politics.⁸ Why is this the case? Some point to political polarization for the degradation of democratic institutions⁹ while others argue that authoritarianism has evolved to become more robust through the use of new technology and by mimicking democratic institutions.¹⁰

Whatever the reason, authoritarian regimes are making a bid for global governance and American hegemony—one country's dominance and influence over others through the projection of its political, cultural, or economic power—has grown increasingly ill-equipped to deal with it. The former liberal, unipolar world order was governed by Western international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO), World Health Organization (WHO), World Bank, and IMF. These institutions set global guidelines that sought to align the world under the vision of Western political, economic, and social culture. However, the biggest sponsor of these organizations, America, has shown signs of shrinking away from its leadership position, recently pulling support from agreements such as the Paris Climate Agreement, WHO, and UNESCO, threatening similar disengagement from other important political, defense, and economic alliances. With this in mind, a power vacuum is created for regional and international groups to contest the existing global governance structure. BRICS may very well take it upon itself to address democratic decline, providing an alternative to Western institutions and establishing itself as a viable candidate for the future of global governance.¹¹

It is important to note that BRICS members vary across regime types, meaning China's model for global governance may look different from India's as a result of their differing

⁸ "State of the World 2024: 25 Years of Autocratization – Democracy Trumped?" *Democratization*, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2025.2487825?scroll=top&needAccess=true#abstract>

⁹ "Polarization versus Democracy." *Journal of Democracy*, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/729166>

¹⁰ "The New Competitive Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy*, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/745953>

"From Liberation to Turmoil: Social Media And Democracy." *Journal of Democracy*, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/671987>

¹¹ "The Diffusion of Global Power and the Decline of Global Governance." *Ethics & International Affairs*, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/diffusion-of-global-power-and-the-decline-of-global-governance/3476B7B05042D2AD2F7806940FB06FAE>

political cultures and ideologies. With these two examples, not only are the political values different, with China being a one party authoritarian state and India being a democracy (although India's democratic standing has been called into question), but the two countries have historically found themselves in competition both politically and economically.¹² Further complicating things, countries may make political statements which contradict their actions. Take Russia as an example: elections may give a weak facade of democracy, but ultimately Vladimir Putin holds the reins. It can consequently be expected that discussion of global democratic backsliding by BRICS members may very well contradict domestic policies and ulterior motives can be at play when promoting global governance policies.¹³ As much as these diverse governments may differ in how they govern themselves, they agree on multipolarism when it comes to governing the world. As previously mentioned, institutions like the World Bank and IMF are viewed as products of a hegemonic and unipolar system under Europe and America. As a result, BRICS members view their role as a voice for the smaller players and developing countries to diversify the perspectives involved in determining global governing decisions.¹⁴

The current disagreement on the policy towards democracy remains a source of tension within BRICS and demands for a unifying policy. Take, for example, the NDB: loans are provided to development projects without conditions attached to regime type and human rights policies. Meanwhile, the World Bank utilizes loans as a carrot and stick to encourage liberal democratization in client governments. In some ways, this works to the benefit of the NDB since it opens the loan market to authoritarian and repressive regimes, giving the financial institution a

¹² "China: Totalitarianism's Long Shadow." *Journal of Democracy*, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/787832>

"The Rise of India's Second Republic." *Journal of Democracy*, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/930426>

¹³ "Russia's War on Woke." *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com>

¹⁴ "BRICS and Global Governance: An Analysis from the Perspective of International Political Economy" *Journal of Fintech and Business Analysis*, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/389953264_BRICS_and_Global_Governance_An_Analysis_from_the_Perspective_of_International_Political_Economy

competitive edge. However, this also can be seen as an endorsement and perpetuation of democratic backsliding by financing autocracies. This shows that even if BRICS formally espouses pro-democracy rhetoric its policies may implicitly suggest otherwise.¹⁵

This position creates a nuanced discourse: the multipolar stance towards international relations encourages a level playing field for global governing institutions and yet BRICS remains ambivalent towards how individual countries conduct themselves within their borders. Globalism—the process of economic, political, and cultural integration of the world as conducted by developed nations such as America—sits in the crosshairs for BRICS nations as a projection of American hegemony. Policies that open the door to alternatives to the Western economic and political sphere can be seen as measures to reassert the sovereignty of developing nations in the face of Western expansion, ultimately moving towards a global multipolar equilibrium. What that means for global governance is that BRICS does not formally share the same interventionist policies as the G7 countries, so its restraint from overtly influencing national politics demands its members to pursue less explicit strategies should they intend to combat democratic backsliding.

BRICS possesses extraordinary potential to reshape the contemporary international order in spite of its disorganization. Today there is a power gap, tomorrow there will be someone to fill it. The group that arises will inherit a landscape of crumbling democracies, faltering international institutions, and a disunified socio-political order, meaning BRICS is poised to hold great influence over the foreseeable future if only it is willing to steel itself for the occasion.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Questions to Consider:

- 1) How does BRICS see itself as a multinational political organization and how might that be influenced by economic interests?
- 2) Can BRICS balance its initiatives to promote economic growth with the preservation of global democracy?
- 3) In the context of a receding global democratic order, should BRICS pursue policies to protect democracy and what tools does it have to do so?
- 4) Does the reduction of American hegemony mark a turning point in the structure of international relations and how might BRICS capitalize on this potential transition?
- 5) How might the democratic decline of one nation influence the politics of global governing institutions as a whole?

Topic 2. Governance of Artificial Intelligence

BRICS views artificial intelligence (AI) as a crucial emergent technology with the ability to level the playing field for many developing countries provided there's equitable access to development. That said, the way in which AI develops may have just as much of an effect on emerging economies as the AI itself. Consequently, BRICS concerns itself with guiding AI development through governing tools such that the resulting technological boom might fortify member states and accelerate economic growth without threatening their sovereignty. As it stands, the AI race remains limited to specific states, with research and development being dominated by the US and China and hardware manufacturers being centered around Taiwan,

South Korea, and Japan.¹⁶ BRICS intends to assert its vision for AI development in a heavily underregulated field in contrast to Western international governance institutions.

BRICS is greatly concerned with digital sovereignty, or in other words allowing nations to self regulate AI. This is seen as a crucial step towards respecting the authority of nations to treat AI as they would most other technologies. Digital sovereignty also promotes research autonomy, allowing nations to cultivate technology economies while protecting itself from external competition. Access and management of energy sources, data centers, and quality training data sets can be guided by state regulation. Note, however, that a limited number of EMDCs are capable of this level of governmental effectiveness and economic output, with countries like China possessing an exceedingly large head start in the AI industry and an efficient government able to productively regulate and control this industry both domestically and internationally. BRICS wants to open up the competitiveness of the AI industry by using regulations to level the cornered market. Equitable access to quality data is crucial for AI development, so member states call for a transparent global structure for domestic industries to access international training data. Still, data privacy and usage for these domestic industries are difficult to monitor and ensure fair practices which would likely fall upon extra-national regulation.¹⁷

When it comes to this extra-national regulation, BRICS views existing multinational organizations like the UN as complimentary to its mission for AI governance. Acknowledging that the scope of AI far surpasses national borders, BRICS views the UN as the preeminent global regulatory authority for AI. Where BRICS may maintain regional authority to set collective AI policies among member states, the UN is arguably an effective middleman for

¹⁶ “China, the United States, and the AI Race” *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/article/china-united-states-and-ai-race>

¹⁷ “BRICS Leaders’ Statement on the Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence” *BRICS Brazil*, http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/250706_BRICS_GGAI_DeclarationFinal.pdf

global cooperation between BRICS and Western countries. This may appear contradictory to BRICS' opposition to Western global institutions, but consider that the UN since its founding has brought politically and economically competing states together to interact and work alongside one another. Examples such as the Security Council with two BRICS members among the Permanent Five would suggest that EMDCs have the ability to voice their interests to their Western counterparts, instilling confidence that the UN can include developing countries in policy making. The benefit to working alongside developed nations through institutions like the UN is that it can reduce asymmetric policies across opposing power circles. This means that rather than parallel regulatory spheres that would create redundant or contradictory policies for AI, the UN can assist in creating a more unified global AI regulation framework. Nevertheless, cooperation runs the risk of returning to the pitfall of EMDCs becoming subordinate to developed nations and losing their claim to digital sovereignty.¹⁸

One more matter at hand is the question of sustainable AI development. For starters, AI proves a serious environmental concern as data processing and AI infrastructure are fairly demanding aspects that put strain on resources and waste disposal. The production of computers found in large-scale data centers requires rare earth metals for their processors which are often mined via environmentally damaging practices. Moreover, much of the initial material used to produce the hardware goes to waste, making the construction of data centers highly inefficient. Then, when the technology at these centers require disposal, the resulting electronic waste often contains hazardous materials such as mercury or lead. The immense amount of computers also requires cooling for AI processing, meaning that data centers run through an excessive amount of water which is both a valuable and scarce resource in many areas of the world. Powering these

¹⁸ "Rio de Janeiro Declaration" *BRICS Brazil*,
<https://brics.br/en/documents/presidency-documents/250705-brics-leaders-declaration-en.pdf>

centers also requires a robust power grid to sustain the constant stream of AI processing, causing more fossil fuels emissions as plants attempt to keep up with the rising power demand (UNEP). BRICS has acknowledged these risks in AI development, but the ability to address these concerns remains uncertain. Pursuit of alternative energy sources and material recycling remain viable options to responsibly develop AI infrastructure, so this emerging industry leaves many avenues to approach environmental sustainability.¹⁹

AI not only has the potential to radically reshape the environment, but it will also likely restructure the labor market, suggesting a possible shake up for many emerging economies. Balancing workers rights and AI development now becomes an important tenet of AI governance as the chance for automation to cause high rates of job loss threatens the stability of BRICS members' economies.²⁰ Moreover, ensuring human oversight over AI data and outputs is crucial to manage issues such as misinformation or hallucinations, but as it stands there are few formal governmental structures to support this. Also, without standardized training data AI models may differ on reliability based on the quality of their source material, posing yet another area where BRICS may want to pioneer some rules for this evolving industry.²¹ Still, implementing economic protections through BRICS may run the risk of infringing on sovereignty. Many member states operate with domestic policies regarding workers' rights that may conflict with parallel BRICS regulations. Countless EMDCs rely on cheap labor forces to fuel large manufacturing bases, so restricting the mass adoption of AI to reduce production costs could leave BRICS member states vulnerable to falling behind competition.

¹⁹ "AI has an environmental problem. Here's what the world can do about that" *United Nations Environmental Programme*, <https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/ai-has-environmental-problem-heres-what-world-can-do-about>

²⁰ "Is AI already impacting job growth?" *JP Morgan*, <https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/artificial-intelligence/ai-impact-job-growth>

²¹ "How Can Reliability of Artificial Intelligence Be Ensured?" *Harvard Data Science Review*, <https://hdsr.mitpress.mit.edu/pub/6j8p2sl1/release/1>

Looking at the matter holistically requires a tightrope walk for BRICS and may very well redefine the authority of the coalition. AI governance can be the proving ground for regulatory power and establish a clear relationship between BRICS and member governments, so the impact of policies lies not just in the substance but also in the manner it is implemented.

Questions to Consider:

- 1) What sector—private, national, or international—should have decision-making authority when it comes to AI governance and development?
- 2) How can access to data for AI training be made reliable and equitable while protecting intellectual property and private information?
- 3) In what ways can economic integration and existing BRICS initiatives such as the NDB help EMDCs develop AI?
- 4) What measures can be taken to protect the environment and workers rights in the growth of the global AI industry?
- 5) What are some possible institutions or policies that BRICS could implement to put checks on AI growth?
- 6) How might AI impact or even reshape how global governance is conducted?

Country Positions

BRICS has a few different tiers of membership that will be distinguished for each position. Beyond the founding five members, there are BRICS+ members who are official participants with voting rights while partners participate in debate and collaborate on agreements but do not vote. There are also delegations who are not necessarily associated formally with

BRICS but are included for the purposes of the committee due to policy similarities. **NOTE: regardless of a delegation's actual status in BRICS, all delegates will have equal voting rights and power in committee.** This distinction is only made in the background guide to clarify the actual structure of BRICS.

1. Argentina

Argentina was invited to be a member of BRICS+ in 2023 but walked away from the coalition in 2024 after the election of Javier Milei.²² Nevertheless, Argentina remains an important voice in Latin America and holds weight in the discussion of democratic decline and AI governance. The political history of Argentina is wrought with regime change and turmoil, but it stands today as a semi-stable democracy battling a crippling national debt, leaving the country reliant upon IMF loans.²³ Regarding AI, Argentina has displayed interest in data protection and ethical transparency, indicating a more proactive stance towards AI regulation.²⁴

2. Bangladesh

Bangladesh was born out of a bloody war of independence in the early 1970s, leaving the country with a fragile democracy with extreme polarization and political violence. The current government has proposed institutional reforms in light of recent protests, exemplifying the nation as a very real picture of the global trend towards democratic backsliding and a push against this pattern.²⁵ Bangladesh's disposition towards AI is very much in line with BRICS' mission for

²² "Why Argentina did not join BRICS+ and what does it mean to its Corporate Governance" *European Corporate Governance Institute*, <https://www.ecgi.global/publications/blog/why-argentina-did-not-join-brics-and-what-does-it-mean-to-its-corporate>

²³ "Argentina's Struggle for Stability" *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/argentinas-struggle-stability>

²⁴ "AI Regulation in Argentina: Building a Responsible Future for Innovation" *Nemko Digital*, <https://digital.nemko.com/regulations/ai-regulation-argentina>

²⁵ "Can Bangladesh Really Reform?" *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/can-bangladesh-really-reform>

equity, collaboration, and sustainability, officially expressing support for transparency and robust checks on AI development.²⁶

3. Belarus

A partner nation in BRICS, Belarus is a staunch authoritarian voice in the international coalition. Opposition repression, election skewing, and political prisoners are all aspects of this illiberal regime. Given this stance, Belarus will likely be opposed to BRICS policies scrutinizing democratic degradation.²⁷ Belarus has worked unilaterally to develop an AI policy that would work in concert with its economic and political interests, building up the nation's technological infrastructure while maintaining censorship of AI services. International agreements of transparency may not be in the best interest of the Belarus government.²⁸

4. Bolivia

After years of a populist left-wing presidency eroding the foundations of Bolivian democracy, the nation has seemingly begun to take a turn back towards democracy. Bolivia represents a partner nation to BRICS on a hesitant recovery out of democratic backsliding, but such a position leaves the country open to seeking aid from organizations such as BRICS to help reinforce this democratizing effort.²⁹ Bolivia, although currently lacking formal regulatory and policing mechanisms for AI, has outlined a desire to ensure transparent data computing and promote digital literacy. Assistance from multilateral efforts to develop ethical AI infrastructure and education would likely serve the betterment of Bolivia's AI industry.³⁰

²⁶ "National Artificial Intelligence Policy 2024" *Information and Communication Technology Division of Bangladesh*, https://ictd.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/ictd.portal.gov.bd/page/6c9773a2_7556_4395_bbec_f132b9d819f0/Draft%20National_AI_Policy_2024.pdf

²⁷ "Belarus: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report" *Freedom House*, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/belarus/freedom-world/2025>

²⁸ "How Belarus is improving the quality of AI services" *United Nations Development Programme*, <https://www.undp.org/belarus/news/how-belarus-improving-quality-ai-services>

²⁹ "Restoring Democracy: Lessons from Bolivia since the 2019 Coupvolution" *The SAIS Review of International Affairs*, <https://saisreview.sais.jhu.edu/restoring-democracy-lessons-from-bolivia-since-the-2019-coupvolution/>

³⁰ "AI Working Group Report" *International Bar Association*, <https://www.ibanet.org/medias/anlbs-ai-working-group-report-july-2024-3-bolivia.pdf>

5. Brazil

As one of the founding members of BRICS, Brazil has always been a key decision-maker. However, several political crises including corruption scandals and high profile imprisonments such as the recent condemnation of former president Jair Bolsonaro to prison, hinder Brazil's ability to expand its influence. Therefore, Brazil might be inclined to protect against democratic backsliding so as to preserve its own stability.³¹ In the realm of AI, in 2024, Brazil's Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation launched a 4 billion USD Plan to incite business projects, develop infrastructure and the improvement of various public services. Therefore, Brazil would support policies falling in line with this framework, as it positions itself as an early adopter of AI in South America.³²

6. Chile

Chile holds a strong reputation as one of Latin America's most stable and economically strong countries. Its democracy might have struggled through military coups, but Chile has shown relative growth and strength even as socio-economic inequality causes internal strife. For this reason Chile is a proponent of proactively addressing global democratic backsliding.³³ Chile has sought to cooperate internationally to develop an AI action plan, breaking down AI systems based on risk assessment and considering regulation based on transparency and risk criteria. Consequently, support for robust AI regulatory structures to protect consumer rights is likely a foremost priority of Chile.³⁴

³¹ "The Brazilian Crisis: Corruption, Neoliberalism, and the Primary Sector" *Monthly Review*, <https://monthlyreview.org/articles/the-brazilian-crisis/>

³² "Launches the Brazilian Artificial Intelligence Plan 2024-2028" *United Nations Trade and Development*, <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor/measure/4930/launches-the-brazilian-artificial-intelligence-plan-2024-2028>

³³ "Chile's Constitutional Rewrite: A Difficult Path Ahead, but a Recipe for Inclusion" *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/chiles-constitutional-rewrite-difficult-path-ahead-recipe-inclusion>

³⁴ "Chile launches a national AI policy and introduces an AI bill following UNESCO's recommendations" *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*, <https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/chile-launches-national-ai-policy-and-introduces-ai-bill-following-unescos-recommendations-0>

7. China

The largest economy in BRICS, China is the key player in regards to advancing projects proposed by other BRICS nations. Indeed, through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has strategically positioned itself as not only a willing investor into big projects, but also as an alternative to Western powers. Through their political system, China may not be concerned with democratic backsliding, so long as the regime in place in other nations allows for continued and increasing trade with China.³⁵ In regards to AI, China leads the way for integration of AI into all aspects of life. Whether socially or economically, China has a heavy focus on regulation while stimulating growth and further research. Therefore, China would support a highly regulated approach to AI governance globally, notably focusing on their World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) proposal.³⁶

8. Cuba

Cuba maintains a fairly strict one-party authoritarian regime that despite the 2019 constitution maintains a strict hold over public and private spheres. Democratic reforms imposed by external parties could easily be perceived as a threat to the existing Cuban political system, so its partnership in BRICS+ is a likely obstacle to democratic backsliding remediation.³⁷ Cuba's AI policy stands relatively underdeveloped, impeded by the lack of an open data policy and extensive government involvement in the industry's development. Cooperation with BRICS in AI policy would be based on maintaining this government sanctioned control of AI progress.³⁸

9. Egypt

³⁵ "China's Growing Influence from BRICS Expansion" *Emory Economics Review*, <https://emoryeconomicsreview.org/articles/2025/1/17/chinas-growing-influence-from-brics-expansion>

³⁶ "China wants to lead the world on AI regulation — will the plan work?" *Nature*, <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-025-03902-y>

³⁷ "Cuba: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report" *Freedom House*, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cuba/freedom-world/2025>

³⁸ "Cuba: Global AI Ethics and Governance Observatory Overview" *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*, <https://www.unesco.org/ethics-ai/en/cuba>

Egypt's official position on democratization holds that democracy is the best form of governance. In practice, however, Egypt often prioritizes stability and order over individual rights, which often leads to authoritarian-adjacent regimes domestically that are more friendly to authoritarianism abroad.³⁹ On technology, Egypt is seen as a model for AI regulation globally. It is investing heavily in AI governance, following UNESCO guidelines to push inclusivity through the National AI Strategy.⁴⁰

10. Ethiopia

Ethiopia has embraced AI as a technology with the potential to expand public-sector productivity, whilst also prioritizing equitable access and technology transfer. There has not been much policy enacted in the way of AI regulation.⁴¹ On global governance, Ethiopia advocates for slow, domestically driven democratic consolidation. It expresses support for international institutions that value national sovereignty and greater representation of African states.⁴²

11. Hungary

Despite being a part of the EU, Hungary serves as a model for global democratic decline under the rule of Victor Orbán and his populist conservative party Fidesz. The Eastern European nation holds close affiliation with BRICS nations such as Russia and actively sets the example for degrading democratic institutions, inspiring other countries to follow Orbán's power consolidation and media manipulation tactics. Consequently, Hungary may very well benefit from encouraging BRICS to actively support the global decline in democracy.⁴³ Hungary has

³⁹ "Promoting Democracy: The Case of Egypt" *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/promoting-democracy-case-egypt>

⁴⁰ "Egypt National Artificial Intelligence Strategy" *The National Council for Artificial Intelligence*, <https://ai.gov.eg/SynchedFiles/en/Resources/AIstrategy%20English%2016-1-2025-1.pdf>

⁴¹ "Ethiopia: Council of Ministers adopted Ethiopian National AI Policy" *Digital Policy Alert*, <https://digitalpolicyalert.org/event/28494-council-of-ministers-adopted-ethiopian-national-ai-policy>

⁴² "Ethiopia: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report" *Freedom House*, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ethiopia/freedom-world/2024>

⁴³ "The New Competitive Authoritarianism" *Journal of Democracy*, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/745953>

also worked towards shifting Europe's AI development to its economy, and with its restrictions on information Hungary is likely to resist agreements for data transparency.⁴⁴

12. India

Multiple assassinations and democratic backsliding have been the main characteristics of Indian democracy in the last few decades. Although the most populous democracy on the planet, the general consensus of the international community is that democratic values and institutions have been eroded since Narendra Modi's election in 2014. From ethnic tensions to unfulfilled promises, Indian democracy is in peril and the delegate of India's position should reflect the urgency with which this democratic crisis needs to be addressed.⁴⁵ As for AI, through the IndiaAI Mission, India has focused its efforts on investments in agriculture. Supporting the domestic labour market and emerging as a technological superpower are the main priorities for the delegate representing India.⁴⁶

13. Indonesia

There lies a rough landscape for Indonesian democracy as a series of strongmen presidents have consolidated power, supported the mistreatment of religious minorities, and skirted democratic institutions. Attempts to combat democratic backsliding from international organizations such as BRICS, would likely be met with resistance from Indonesia as added scrutiny would interfere with ongoing autocratic practices in the country.⁴⁷ Economically Indonesia has thrived off of foreign investment, subtly and indirectly placing itself in

⁴⁴ "Progress in Implementing the European Union Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence (Volume 1): Hungary" Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/progress-in-implementing-the-european-union-coordinated-plan-on-artificial-intelligence-volume-1_6d530a88-en/hungary_e87ac822-en.html#:~:text=Acquire%2C%20pool%20and%20share%20policy%20insights&text=Hungary%27s%20national%20AI%20strategy%2C%20launched.and%20AI%2Dpowered%20customer%20services

⁴⁵ "Why India's Democracy Is Dying" *Journal of Democracy*, <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/why-indias-democracy-is-dying/>

⁴⁶ "India Artificial Intelligence" *International Trade Administration*, <https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/india-artificial-intelligence-0>

⁴⁷ "Prabowo Wins. Does Indonesian Democracy Lose?" *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/prabowo-wins-does-indonesian-democracy-lose>

competition with China in a bid for influence over East-Asia. Its pursuit of rapid economic growth has put Indonesia in a development first mindset, this is to say that international cooperation would best benefit Indonesia if it aligns with this rapid national AI industrial growth.⁴⁸

14. Iran

Iran has major incentives to push an ideologically-driven development plan for BRICS. Although there is widespread animosity towards the West amongst national leadership, Iran maintains no official stance on democracy. Despite this, Iran maintains that its theocratic autocracy is the best system of governance for Iran, and its delegate's position should reflect this.⁴⁹ On AI, Iran sees the need for extensive regulation of the technology, and has established the National Artificial Intelligence Organization to develop policy.⁵⁰

15. Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan has balanced a nuanced relationship with foreign partners, maintaining close ties with nearby powers like Russia and China who hold historical and economic interests in the nation while working bilaterally with Western nations. Its partner position in BRICS+ comes as a non-committal move by abstaining from full member status, keeping the central Asian nation in an open political position.⁵¹ Pair this shrinking away from multilateral allegiances with Kazakhstan's tight authoritarian regime and the nation is likely to resist most multinational agreements combating democratic backsliding.⁵² Kazakhstan's relationship with AI has been

⁴⁸ "Indonesia Artificial Intelligence" *Asia Society Policy Institute*, <https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/raising-standards-data-ai-southeast-asia/ai/indonesia>

⁴⁹ "Bodies in Revolt, Challenging the State in Iran" *University of California Press*, <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1KcnQC1BZTme7DCEXitxsCRk8YST3JAWJH-Jk3Eaed1I/edit?usp=sharing>

⁵⁰ "Objective of National Artificial Intelligence Association of Iran" *National Artificial Intelligence Organization*, <https://iranaij.ir/en/>

⁵¹ "Kazakhstan Survives Among the Big Powers" *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/kazakhstan-survives-among-big-powers>

⁵² "Kazakhstan: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report" *Freedom House*, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/kazakhstan/freedom-world/2025>

vague, leaving much of its regulations open-ended especially towards human rights and personal liberties. Keeping AI in check with human oversight is a crucial aspect for regulation in Kazakhstan's draft national AI policy, likely serving as an important contribution to BRICS' policy agenda.⁵³

16. Malaysia

Recently, a strong oppositional party has unseated the previous political coalition in Malaysia, forcing a new political climate of compromise and gradual democratic reform and making Malaysia a hesitant counter to global trends of democratic backsliding. This relatively young phenomenon is unstable and would greatly benefit from international cooperation in BRICS to support its democratization efforts.⁵⁴ Malaysian AI policy views the government as a tool to ensure trust in AI models, naming fairness, reliability, and privacy as top priorities in governing AI development. Consequently, sustainable and ethical training for AI models is crucial for Malaysian policy makers when advising international bodies such as BRICS on the matter.⁵⁵

17. Mexico

Mexico has had a questionable relationship with democracy, suffering from an extended one party system that controlled the government throughout most of the 20th century. That trend appeared to trend to multipartisanship around the turn of the century, but the emergence of the left-wing populist Morena party has seen a return to reducing checks on party power.⁵⁶ Mexico is yet to outline a formal AI policy and its AI industry ranks fairly underdeveloped on the global

⁵³ "Kazakhstan's New AI Draft Law: From Concept to Regulation" *Nemko Digital*, <https://digital.nemko.com/regulations/ai-regulation-kazakhstan>

⁵⁴ "Malaysia: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report" *Freedom House*, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/malaysia/freedom-world/2024>

⁵⁵ "The National Guidelines on AI Governance and Ethics" *Malaysian Science and Technology Information Centre*, <https://mastic.mosti.gov.my/publication/the-national-guidelines-on-ai-governance-ethics/>

⁵⁶ "Is Mexico at the Gates of Authoritarianism?" *Journal of Democracy*, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/947883>

scale. Nevertheless, Mexico has seen significant advances in the AI economy relative to Latin America and would greatly benefit in increased government support of rapid research and development investment.⁵⁷

18. Nigeria

Corruption and over-reliance on oil exports has limited the development of Nigerian democracy. Even as the country has made steps towards improving its electoral system, the government remains ineffective, making the general Nigerian disposition towards democracy ambivalent as citizens look for results in improving the economy before liberalization.⁵⁸ With AI Nigeria has sought to create a regulatory sandbox for testing new models and encouraging development, making the nation a powerful advocate for innovation-friendly policies.⁵⁹

19. Pakistan

Pakistan has struggled since its independence in 1947 to cultivate a stable and effective government. Pakistan consistently finds its democratic institutions skirted and regimes changing as factions vie for power, making the question of democratic backsliding extremely pertinent for a country whose government borders on dysfunctional.⁶⁰ Pakistan is gearing towards fostering—to the best of its abilities—a quickly growing, independent, and autonomous domestic AI industry. Internal polarization and cultural sensitivity may prove an issue for censorship and Pakistan’s angst to hastily develop AI might be an obstacle to BRICS policies.⁶¹

20. United Arab Emirates (UAE)

⁵⁷ “Mexico: Global AI Ethics and Governance Observatory Overview” *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*, <https://www.unesco.org/ethics-ai/en/mexico>

⁵⁸ “Nigeria’s Democratic Malaise” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/nigeria/nigerias-democratic-malaise>

⁵⁹ “AI Regulation in Nigeria” *Nemko Digital*, <https://digital.nemko.com/regulations/ai-regulation-in-nigeria>

⁶⁰ “Pakistan’s Fragile Foundations” *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/pakistans-fragile-foundations>

⁶¹ “National Artificial Intelligence Policy” *Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunication*, <https://moitt.gov.pk/SiteImage/Misc/files/National%20AI%20Policy.pdf>

The UAE's position on global governance is quite pragmatic, pushing a strategy that emphasizes order, even if that order comes from authoritarian rule. While it does promote certain aspects of democratization, it has a history of democratic suppression domestically.⁶² The UAE's approach to AI regulation is multifaceted and is based on the UAE National Strategy for AI 2031. The UAE seeks to incorporate AI into governance, whilst embracing it to continue its explosive economic and technological development.⁶³

21. Russia

As a founding member of BRICS, Russia has been a constant and undeniable presence in major BRICS projects. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2023, international sanctions and general distrust for the current regime have pushed Russia to deepen ties with other BRICS nations. As an authoritarian regime, Russia does not concern itself with democratic backsliding and instead the current regime sees its legitimacy in economic development, notably around natural resources and select individuals, known as oligarchs.⁶⁴ In the domain of AI, Russia would favour the integration of a network of initiatives made with allies and like-minded countries. However, Russia does place an extremely large emphasis on autonomy and its own military capacities in regards to AI given the ongoing war and subsequent economic sanctions.⁶⁵

22. Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is a major U.S. ally. As such, it should frame its participation in BRICS as a way to foster balanced global governance reform that gives EMDCs greater representation,

⁶² "About the UAE: The Political System" *Telecommunications and Digital Government Regulatory Authority*, <https://u.ae/en/about-the-uae/the-uae-government/political-system-and-government>

⁶³ "National ai strategy 2031 and the national program for artificial intelligence" *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*, <https://www.unesco.org/creativity/en/policy-monitoring-platform/national-ai-strategy-2031-and-national-program-artificial-intelligence>

⁶⁴ "Russia & Democratic Backsliding: The Future of Putinism" *Harvard International Review*, <https://hir.harvard.edu/russia-democratic-backsliding-the-future-of-putinism/>

⁶⁵ "Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy in Russia" *Center for Naval Analyses*, <https://www.cna.org/centers-and-divisions/cna/rsp/russia-studies/artificial-intelligence-and-autonomy-in-russia>

whilst also maintaining ties with the West.⁶⁶ To do so, the Kingdom can emphasize its innovations in AI risk management through agencies like the Saudi Data and Artificial Intelligence Authority (SDAIA).⁶⁷ As a monarchy, the Kingdom has a history of suppression of democratic advocates, and takes a rather neutral stance on democratization abroad.⁶⁸ Generally, it should push BRICS to be less ideologically driven, and more focused on economic and technological cooperation.

23. South Africa

South Africa holds importance in the BRICS organisation not only as a founding member but also as a key stronghold for its operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, its stance towards the rest of the BRICS nations has been ambivalent, at times voting against the bloc at UN General Assembly meetings.⁶⁹ Social unrest following the arrest of former president Jacob Zuma in 2021, the lack of transparency amongst government officials and the suppression of political participation have all contributed to democratic backsliding in South Africa. This poses the question of whether to prioritize economic growth or safeguard democracy.⁷⁰ In regards to AI, South Africa may be the most developed nation on the continent, however it still lags behind the rest of the BRICS nations. Therefore, the delegate of South Africa should focus on not only expanding the infrastructure domestically but also investing significantly in talent management and recruitment in order to stay competitive in the age of AI.⁷¹

⁶⁶ “Saudi Arabia sits on fence over BRICS with eye on vital ties with US” *Reuters*,

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-sits-fence-over-brics-with-eye-vital-ties-with-us-2025-05-08/>

⁶⁷ “Artificial Intelligence Regulation” *Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, <https://my.gov.sa/en/content/109729>

⁶⁸ “Saudi Arabia: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report” *Freedom House*,

<https://freedomhouse.org/country/saudi-arabia/freedom-world/2022>

⁶⁹ “South Africa faces new dynamics at BRICS summit” *GIS Reports Online*,

<https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/brics-summit-2024-south-africa/>

⁷⁰ “The risks of failed democratic consolidation” *GIS Reports Online*, <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/south-africa-protests/>

⁷¹ “AI and Africa: The unexplored frontier of innovation and inclusivity” *T20 South Africa*,

<https://t20southafrica.org/commentaries/ai-and-africa-the-unexplored-frontier-of-innovation-and-inclusivity/>

24. Singapore

Singapore holds ties across both BRICS members and Western nations, keeping it in the middle ground of opposing forces. The government's relation with democracy is tenuous, with a one party system creating an environment hostile to competition as a result of anti-opposition policies.⁷² Singapore has worked to instill reliability and trust in AI models through its national regulatory framework, promoting software toolkits to verify and test models in accordance with its AI ethics principles.⁷³

25. Thailand

Thailand has a reputation of a less than democratic regime with a predominant conservative party maintaining restrictive laws and flirting with military factions. Despite a brief period of a reform minded party rising to power, the current Thai government appears poised to regress its democratic progress, corroborating global trends of democratic backsliding.⁷⁴ The Thai AI policy intends to establish computing and regulatory infrastructure aimed at a competitive AI industry for the coming years. Policies that encourage building human capital centered around AI and investing in individual national AI economies would be extremely useful to Thailand's industry aspirations.⁷⁵

26. Turkiye

Turkiye serves as a prime example of what has been coined an "electoral authoritarian" regime, with democratic institutions giving the appearance of democracy while a party/leader exerts nearly unrestricted authority over these false checks on power. This leads Turkiye to

⁷² "Singapore Holds an Election Amidst a World at (Trade) War" *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/singapore-holds-election-amidst-world-trade-war>

⁷³ "Singapore's Approach to AI Governance" *Personal Data Protection Commission of Singapore*, <https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/help-and-resources/2020/01/model-ai-governance-framework>

⁷⁴ "Thailand's Turbulence: Implications for the Region and the World" *Council on Foreign Relations* <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/thailands-turbulence-implications-region-and-world>

⁷⁵ "Thailand national AI strategy and action plan" *AI Thailand*, <https://www.ai.in.th/en/about-ai-thailand/>

officially stake claim to democratic legitimacy while unofficially undermining democratic institutions, making it relatively ambivalent or even accepting towards democratic backsliding.⁷⁶

Turkiye's AI policy has encouraged robust checks and audits for AI risk management and alignment with international standards to ensure cross-border compatibility.⁷⁷

27. Uganda

Despite outward support for the protection of individual liberties and approval of democracy globally, Uganda conducts its internal affairs without much respect for those same personal rights. Attempts made by international institutions such as BRICS to combat democratic decline and align Uganda's policies with its rhetoric can be expected to be met with resistance.⁷⁸

Uganda's AI policy, while still developing, has worked alongside international partners to implement AI in health and security industries.⁷⁹

28. Uruguay

A rare exception to the trends of democratic backsliding, Uruguay stands as a bastion of robust liberal democracy in a region overcome with corruption and eroded democratic institutions. Uruguay's engagement with BRICS has been mostly centered around economic development interests, but it can nevertheless be viewed as having an affinity towards a multipolar global governance structure that endorses democratic preservation.⁸⁰ Although lacking in technological infrastructure, Uruguay possesses a strong renewable energy sector that could prove useful for global AI development. Moreover, preservation of individual rights such as data

⁷⁶ "Turkish Democracy Can't Die, Because It Never Lived" *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/article/turkish-democracy-cant-die-because-it-never-lived>

⁷⁷ "Digital Regulation in Turkey: Laws on AI and Personal Data" *Nemko Digital*, <https://digital.nemko.com/regulations/ai-regulation-in-turkey>

⁷⁸ "Uganda: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report" *Freedom House*, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/uganda/freedom-world/2025>

⁷⁹ "Uganda AI Regulation: Digital Policy and Legal Framework" *Nemko Digital*, <https://digital.nemko.com/regulations/uganda-ai-regulation>

⁸⁰ "Uruguay's Democracy: A Model for Stability in Latin America" *Harvard International Review*, <https://hir.harvard.edu/uruguays-democracy-a-model-for-stability-in-latin-america/>

privacy, user protection, and trustworthiness are all key priorities for Uruguay when regulating AI models.⁸¹

29. Uzbekistan

The current political climate in Uzbekistan lacks competitive elections and independent media, undermining existing democratic structures in the country by consolidating political authority under a single party. As is the case for many other nations in this committee, Uzbekistan is unlikely to promote BRICS' involvement in combating democratic backsliding.⁸² AI is viewed as an extremely promising governance tool in Uzbekistan with the government planning on adopting AI en masse to cover bureaucratic responsibilities. Uzbekistan would likely push for responsible AI regulation that stimulates government efficiency.⁸³

30. Vietnam

Trade and economic growth demands Vietnam to approach global democratic decline pragmatically. That said, its domestic policy towards political and social freedoms reflects repressive tendencies of a single party authoritarian state, compelling the manufacturing powerhouse to prefer a non-interventionist policy that prioritizes economic ties.⁸⁴ Vietnam has pushed for advancing its AI industry to avoid technological dependency, viewing AI as a primary tool towards economic growth. These policies may fly in the face of domestic workers rights, threatening job replacement and lower wages. Vietnam would benefit from lax BRICS regulations that foster rapid national economic growth.⁸⁵

⁸¹ "Uruguay: Global AI Ethics and Governance Observatory Overview" *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*, <https://www.unesco.org/ethics-ai/en/uruguay>

⁸² "Uzbekistan: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report" *Freedom House*, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/uzbekistan/freedom-world/2025>

⁸³ "Uzbekistan to drastically reduce bureaucracy and train 5 million AI citizens by 2030" *EuroNews*, <https://www.euronews.com/2025/11/28/uzbekistan-to-dramatically-reduce-bureaucracy-and-train-5-million-ai-specialists-by-2030>

⁸⁴ "Vietnam: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report" *Freedom House*, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/vietnam/freedom-world/2025>

⁸⁵ "Vietnam unveils draft artificial intelligence law" *Global Legal Insights*, <https://www.globallegalinsights.com/news/vietnam-unveils-draft-artificial-intelligence-law/>

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<https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-025-03902-y>.

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www.gisreportsonline.com/r/brics-summit-2024-south-africa/.

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Aug. 2021, www.gisreportsonline.com/r/south-africa-protests/. Accessed 11 Jan. 2026.

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