

Background Guide



WAMUNC XXVI

ASEAN



Letter from the Chair

Esteemed Delegates,

Welcome to the 26th Annual Session of the Washington Area Model United Nations Conference (WAMUNC)! My name is Daniel Catapang, and I have the distinct honor of serving as your chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

I am a first-year student at the Elliott School of International Affairs from the San Francisco Bay Area. I'm double majoring in International Affairs (with a Security Policy Concentration) and Asian Studies, alongside a prospective minor in History.

I have been a delegate in Model UN since my freshman year of high school and now compete on the GWMUN Travel Team. Alongside staffing WAMUNC, I also staff GWCIA and SCVMUN back home in California. Outside of MUN, I am also a contributor and reviewer for *The Globe*, the International Affairs Society's Research Journal. I also participate in and write drills for Strategic Crisis Simulations (GW's Wargaming Club), and am a member of the Alexander Hamilton Society and the Filipino Cultural Society. My academic and professional interests lie in history, foreign languages, U.S Security Policy, and global politics. However, my personal interests involve watching marching band videos, cooking, and researching even more history.

In ASEAN, you'll tackle the South China Sea Dispute and counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia. You'll consider international maritime law, issues of sovereignty, and the ramifications for the greater US-China rivalry. Meanwhile, counter-terrorism will require delegates to address ethno-religious divisions, socio-economic challenges, and resource limitations of member states.

Delegates are expected to consider these issues and more in crafting comprehensive and effective solutions to these complex issues facing the region today.

I look forward to hearing your fruitful debate and discussion on these complex issues that face the Southeast Asian region. Let's make this session at WAMUNC a rewarding experience for everyone!

Best regards,

Daniel Catapang

Committee Background

On the 8th of August, 1967, delegates from Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia came together in Bangkok to sign the Bangkok Declaration that officially created the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Bangkok Declaration had the stated goals of advancing regional cooperation in economic growth, cultural expression, and regional peace to advance Southeast Asian Nations.¹ With the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, ASEAN expanded to include Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei, and Laos. To promote further cooperation between member states, several agreements were developed including the Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) that committed ASEAN states to non-proliferation, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976) that promoted the principles of ASEAN cooperation and the Chiang-Mai Initiative that established a currency swap deal during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.² These agreements culminated in the ratification of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, creating a legal identity and institutional framework for ASEAN alongside highlighting its key values and principles. It further established the three ASEAN Pillars of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Political-Security Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.³ These pillars are at the core of ASEAN's modern mission today as it seeks to create a single Southeast Asian market, promote regional peace and security, and advance Southeast Asian culture at home and abroad.

One of the key sister organizations of ASEAN is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Founded in 1997, the ARF acts as an ASEAN-related organization to tackle security issues in Southeast Asia and includes 27 Countries and the European Union. The ARF seeks to tackle the diverse security issues of Southeast Asia through a three-stage process, First, Confidence Building measures, Second, Preventative Diplomacy and Third, Conflict Resolution.⁴

While ARF traditionally operates through group consensus, allowing for any participant of ARF to veto an action, for the purposes of this committee, a simple majority vote shall decide all actions taken by ASEAN on resolutions. Furthermore, all delegations will have equal voting rights and privileges regardless of their membership status within ASEAN.

¹ Association of Southeast Asian Nations. "The Founding of ASEAN." ASEAN. asean.org/the-founding-of-asean/

² Council on Foreign Relations. "What Is ASEAN?" Council on Foreign Relations, September 18, 2023, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-asean#chapter-title-0-1

³ Association of Southeast Asian Nations. "Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations." ASEAN, November 2007, asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/21069.pdf.

⁴ Hassan, Mohamed Jawhar. The ASEAN Regional Forum: Challenges and Prospects. The Pacific Forum, June 2021. pacforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/issuesinsights_Vol21WP8.pdf.

Topic A: Navigating Turbulent Waters—Resolving the South China Sea Dispute

Historical Context

The area, now known as the South China Sea, has been navigated by various groups over the millennia, from Chinese traders to Malay fishermen. In a time when the concept of maritime boundaries was non-existent, few if any cared about who owned the sea or the collection of islands within it. It wasn't until 1933 when France claimed the Spratly and Paracel islands as part of French Indochina that anyone paid any attention to these islands. Japan would briefly seize these islands from 1939 to 1945 during its occupation of Indochina before surrendering its claim following its defeat in the Second World War. The Republic of China (ROC) claimed these islands in 1947 under the 11-Dash Line that gave China claim to over 90% of the South China Sea. After the Chinese Civil War, the People's Republic of China (PRC) continued the Chinese claim to the South China Sea in 1949.

However, in 1952, the PRC revised its claim to the 9-dash line that notably granted the Gulf of Tonkin to Vietnamese authorities, and today the 9-dash lines remain the basis of the PRC's claim in the region. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) initially recognized the claims made by the Chinese to continue receiving aid in the Vietnam War. North Vietnam would later backtrack and claim the Spratlys in 1975, and later all islands in the South China Sea in 1979. At the same time, the Philippines asserted its claim to a majority of the Spratly Islands in 1978 by Presidential Decree.⁵ Meanwhile, Malaysia would establish its claims in the South China Sea from an official map claiming part of the Spratlys in 1979.⁶ Violence in the region would reach its peak in 1988 when the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and Vietnam People's Army (VPA) vessels and personnel clashed, resulting in 64 Vietnamese sailors being killed and Chinese control over the Johnson South Reef as part of the Spratly Islands.⁷ Further skirmishes between Chinese authorities and Filipino, Vietnamese, and Malaysian authorities would occur today. In 1982, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted and later went into effect in 1994. By 1996, all parties in the South China Sea dispute had ratified UNCLOS and it had become the basis of many of the claims in the South China Sea.⁸ This comes with the notable exception of China's claim despite it being a ratifier of UNCLOS. As no further solution could be agreed upon, in 2002, China and the ASEAN Community agreed to the Declaration On The Conduct Of Parties In The South China Sea. This non-legally binding agreement was meant to act as a declaration between ASEAN and China to "enhance favourable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among countries concerned" concerning the


⁵ Marcos, Ferdinand E. "Presidential Decree No. 1596, s. 1978." *Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines*, June 11, 1978. www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1978/06/11/presidential-decree-no-1596-s-1978/.

⁶ "Malaysia." *The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)*, Maritime Awareness Project, July 9, 2020. www.nbr.org/publication/malaysia/.

⁷ Collin, Koh Swee Lean, and Ngo Minh Tri. "Learning from the Battle of the Spratly Islands." *The Diplomat*, March 20, 2018. thediplomat.com/2018/03/learning-from-the-battle-of-the-spratly-islands/.

⁸ "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." *International Maritime Organization*, December 10, 1982. www.imo.org/en/ourwork/legal/pages/unitednationsconventiononthelawofthesea.aspx.

territorial disputes in the South China Sea.⁹ Despite this declaration, many analysts have agreed that this declaration has done little to create a resolution to the conflict in the region.



Current Situation

The South China Sea today is one of the most economically valuable areas in the world today, with \$3.37 Trillion worth of traded goods passed through there in 2016, accounting for close to a third of global trade.¹⁰ With the South China Sea being the gateway towards the Strait of Malacca that opens Asia to Western markets, the region is particularly important to the trade-dependent economies of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and China.


The region also poses a major security concern for these nations as 90% of the imported oil to Japan, Korea, and China moves through the South China Sea from Middle Eastern suppliers.¹¹ Furthermore, the South China Sea is abundant in natural resources like fish, natural gas, and oil. It is estimated that 12% of all fishing is conducted in the South China Sea, despite only being

⁹"Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea." *Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, May 14, 2012. asean.org/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2/.

¹⁰Schrag, Jacque. "How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?" *ChinaPower Project*, January 25, 2021. chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/#:~:text=Writings%20on%20the%20South%20China,in%20world%20trade%20over%20the.

¹¹Dunn, Candace, and Justine Barden. "More than 30% of Global Maritime Crude Oil Trade Moves through the South China Sea." *Today in Energy*, U.S Energy Information Administration, August 27, 2018. www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36952.

2.5% of the ocean surface.¹² The region has proven reserves of at least 7.7 billion barrels and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, with American and Chinese sources providing conflict with exact numbers.¹³ Thus the South China Sea is an incredibly economically lucrative region, with many Northeast Asian countries like China and Japan being dependent on the region for their trade security.



Thus the conflict over control of the region has dramatically expanded in scale, scope, and importance on the international scene. Today, the region is contested by the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. In 2013, the People's Republic of China began a large-scale expansion of the South China Sea islands. China artificially expanded several islands in the Spratly and Paracels while expanding its military presence in the region. While China was not the first to artificially expand islands, their actions have taken artificial expansion of islands to its largest extent compared to more limited actions taken by Vietnam and the Philippines. Since 2013, China has built 20 outposts in the Paracel Islands alongside another 7 in the Spratly Islands with an estimated expansion of

¹²Harrington, Kent. "Commentary: South China Sea May Run out of Fish at This Rate of Overfishing." *Channel News Asia*, February 5, 2022.

www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/south-china-sea-china-environmental-ecological-damage-coral-reefs-overfishing-international-law-2469871#:~:text=Though%20it%20accounts%20for%20only,of%20the%20world's%20fish%20catch.

¹³Ghosh, PK. "Artificial Islands in the South China Sea." *The Diplomat*, September 23, 2014. thediplomat.com/2014/09/artificial-islands-in-the-south-china-sea/.

3,200 acres of additional land.¹⁴ The military development of several islands in the South China Sea now includes communication systems, aircraft hangers, and runways, alongside surface-to-air and surface-to-ship missile systems.¹⁵



Legal Framework

The South China Sea dispute is underpinned by a complex legal framework to consider when creating solutions to the dispute. The key document concerning International Maritime Law is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which first entered effect in 1994. Under UNCLOS, nations have a legal claim of 12 nautical miles from their coast as territorial waters, another 12 nautical miles as their Contiguous Waters, and then 200 nautical miles from a nation's coast as its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Within a nation's territorial waters, no foreign vessel may enter except for innocent passage. Meanwhile, the EEZ of a nation gives that nation

¹⁴ "China Island Tracker." *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*. Accessed November 19, 2023. anti.csis.org/island-tracker/.

¹⁵ "Chinese Power Projection Capabilities in the South China Sea." *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*, June 15, 2021. anti.csis.org/chinese-power-projection/.

first preference on all economic resources found within the EEZ. Most countries involved in the South China Sea dispute base their maritime claims based upon the UNCLOS guidelines in following International Maritime Law except China with its 9-dash line. China has instead argued for a historical claim to the region due to claimed documented evidence of Chinese claims in the region alongside discoveries of ancient Chinese artifacts in the South China Sea. China's historic rights claim would be rejected by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 2016 in *Philippines v. China*. This case by the PCA is one of the few legally binding aspects of the conflict and has significant importance to the legal arguments concerning the South China Sea dispute. *Philippines v. China* was initiated in 2013 by the Philippines following the Scarborough Shoal Standoff in 2012 between the PLAN/China Coast Guard and the Philippine Navy which led to the Shoal being occupied by the Chinese.¹⁶ In *Philippines v. China*, the Philippines argued that the nine-dash line violated UNCLOS as the features of South China such as most of the Spratlys and Paracel Islands cannot sustain life and thus cannot have their own continental shelf in accordance with UNCLOS.¹⁷ The Chinese refused to participate in arbitration, seeing the tribunal as lacking jurisdiction and accusing the Philippines of violating the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2002). The PCA's Award declared that China's historical 9-dash line claim was unlawful, declared several features of the South China Sea to be rocks, and thus not entitled to an EEZ, and that China had unlawfully developed Philippine territory and allowed unlawful fishing in Philippine Waters.¹⁸ Despite this award, China would declare that they do not recognize the award of the PCA and would be considered "null and void" to China.¹⁹ The legal background of the South China Sea is as complex as the diplomatic conflict itself, and delegates must consider the legal precedents and norms that nations are expected to follow when developing their solutions.

Conclusion

The South China Sea dispute is one full of nuances and complexities that have challenged policymakers, diplomats, and world leaders for decades. The South China Sea continues to be a major focal point of geopolitical and economic interests for the entire world in our modern globalized world and finding a lasting solution to this conflict is critical for future global prosperity. Delegate's solutions must consider the legal framework of international maritime law, questions of national sovereignty, and wider geopolitical and security matters to establish effective long-term solutions for this conflict. The complexity of the South China Sea issue necessitates a nuanced approach that balances the interests of the involved nations while fostering international cooperation for the stability and security of the region.

¹⁶Hicks, Kathleen, et al. "Counter-Coercion Series: Scarborough Shoal Standoff." *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*, June 22, 2017. amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/.

¹⁷Callar, Michaela Del. "ITLOS Completes Five-Man Tribunal That Will Hear PHL Case vs. China." *GMA News Online*, April 25, 2013.

www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/305570/itlos-completes-five-man-tribunal-that-will-hear-phl-case-vs-china/story/.

¹⁸"PCA Case No 2013-19." *Permanent Court of Arbitration*, July 12, 2016.


www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN%20-%202020160712%20-%20Award.pdf.

¹⁹"Beijing Rejects Tribunal's Ruling in South China Sea Case." *The Guardian*, July 12, 2016.

www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china.

Questions to Consider

- 1) Does your nation have a claim in the South China Sea, if not does it have a maritime claim in other regions of the world?
- 2) How does the South China Sea affect your nation's economic well-being and growth?
- 3) How can legal precedents and international treaties be used to create a peaceful solution in the region, with special consideration for UNCLOS?
- 4) Does your country have special security/geopolitical concerns in the South China Sea, if so how has that affected its stance around the issue?
- 5) As a regional body with limited legal power, how can ASEAN create meaningful influence on a resolution to the South China Sea dispute?



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
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"Malaysia." The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), Maritime Awareness Project, July 9, 2020. www.nbr.org/publication/malaysia/.

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
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Topic B: Countering Extremism and Militancy—Regional Strategies for Southeast Asia

Historical Context and Current Situation

Ever since the region's independence from European colonization in the 1950s, Southeast Asia has faced numerous militant threats to the nation-states that emerged after decolonization. From ethnic separatists to criminal pirates to religious extremists, the region faced and continues to be challenged by militancy in the region. However, starting in the 1990s, and especially following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, terrorism has made a stark rise in the region, challenging the security order of Southeast Asia.



Terrorist Attacks in Southeast Asia

While there remains no internationally legally recognized definition of terrorism, the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) defines a terrorist attack as "...the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a nonstate actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear coercion, or intimidation."²⁰ Understanding this, the origins of many of the terrorist organizations of the region lie within the militant organizations that emerged following independence, particularly the Islamic extremist organizations that have become the most well-known within the region. Islamic extremist organizations like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and

²⁰Miller, Erin, et al. "Information on More than 200,000 Terrorist Attacks." Global Terrorism Database, Oct. 2022, www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Abu Sayyaf (ASG) emerged from earlier Muslim separatist groups in the Philippines and Indonesia. While many other smaller organizations exist in the region, most have either an association with the Islamic State (IS) like ASG or Al-Qaeda like JI. Today, these groups remain at large and have been responsible for numerous terrorist attacks in the region.

While terrorist activity had existed since the 1990s, terrorism in the region began to make national headlines following the tragic 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001, starting the International War on Terror by the US and its allies. In the aftermath of the attack in 2002, JI conducted a series of bombings of tourist areas on the island of Bali in Indonesia. This tragic event would kill 202 people, mostly Westerners, and be known as the 2002 Bali Bombings.²¹ This initial attack became a major wake-up call for the world, alarming the region of the potential dangers of terrorism in the region and motivated advancements in counterterrorism by Southeast Asian nations. Furthermore, JI's ties with Al-Qaeda led to worldwide concern around the multidimensional reach Islamic terrorism had established.

The Rise and subsequent Fall of the Islamic State (IS) in the 2010s would further exacerbate the situation in the region. The formation of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attracted many radical Islamic elements worldwide, with the defeat of ISIS in Syria, many of the members of ISIS spread across the globe as members of IS, collaborating with its allies across the globe, particularly ASG and now defunct Maute Group.²² ASG had already conducted the deadliest terrorist attack in Filipino history in the 2004 bombing of MV SuperFerry 14, leading to 116 deaths.²³ The actions of these organizations would be taken further. With the broad support of IS, ASG and the Maute Group seized the city of Marawi in Mindanao, the center of Muslims in the Christian Philippines in 2017. The Philippines had just moved out of a prolonged conflict in Mindanao against the Muslim separatist organizations, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), with a permanent ceasefire only being agreed upon in 2014. However, this attack began a 5-month Siege of the city, with intense urban fighting between terrorist elements and the Philippine Armed Forces and Police. The Siege of Marawi became the largest urban battle in Filipino history, and with Western support, the Philippines retook the city and killed many leaders of the organizations, including the Maute Brothers which led to the end of the Maute group as a unified force.²⁴ However, this siege came at a significant civilian and military cost and highlighted the true danger the Philippines faced against IS-backed terrorist groups.

While the Bali Bombings and the Siege of Marawi were some of the flashiest terrorist attacks to date, there remain dozens of smaller attacks that have occurred across Southeast Asia over the last few years. According to the Global Terrorism Index, Myanmar, the Philippines, Indonesia,

²¹BBC News. "The 12 October 2002 Bali Bombing Plot." BBC, 11 Oct. 2012, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19881138.

²² Liow, Joseph Chinyong. "ISIS in the Pacific: Assessing Terrorism in Southeast Asia and the Threat to the Homeland." Brookings, 27 Apr. 2016, www.brookings.edu/articles/isis-in-the-pacific-assessing-terrorism-in-southeast-asia-and-the-threat-to-the-homeland.

²³SAFETY4SEA. "Superferry14: The World's Deadliest Terrorist Attack at Sea." 27 Feb. 2019, safety4sea.com/cm-superferry14-the-worlds-deadliest-terrorist-attack-at-sea/.

²⁴ <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/marawi-crisis-urban-conflict-and-information-operations>

and Thailand are the most affected by terrorism in the region, and terrorism in the region remains ever present in the region.²⁵



Maritime Terrorism

Due to Southeast Asia's unique geography which is dominated by the Malay Archipelago and the Indochinese Peninsula, there has been a unique rise of maritime terrorism in the region. Many of the terrorist organizations that operate in the region have resorted to the use of pirate tactics to enact their goals. The ASG, being based in the islands of Sulu and Basilin has shown to have the greatest maritime capabilities, however, JI and the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) are known to have high levels of maritime operation ability.²⁶ The attacks on USS Cole in 2000, MV Limburg in 2002, SuperFerry 14 in 2004, and the M Star in 2010 have shown the major damage that terrorist organizations are capable of through maritime terrorism tactics. With Southeast Asia's geographic chokehold on the global economy, accounting for about 40% of international trade, the economic value at risk of terrorist attack is immense.²⁷ Thus delegates must ensure that

²⁵Vision of Humanity. "Global Terrorism Index: Countries Most Impacted by Terrorism." 2022, www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/.

²⁶Oreta, Jennifer Santiago. "Terrorism as an Evolving Threat to Southeast Asia's Maritime Security." Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 28 Mar. 2023, amti.csis.org/maritime-terrorism-as-an-evolving-threat-to-southeast-asias-security/.

²⁷Meng Wee, Joses Yau. "Maritime Terrorism Threat in Southeast Asia and Its Challenges." Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/safti/pointer/documents/pdf/V43N2a3.pdf. Accessed 20 Nov. 2023.

when developing their solutions, they consider the issues surrounding maritime terrorism alongside the more “traditional” land-based terrorist tactics used by organizations the world over.

Abu Sayyaf (ASG)

Abu Sayyaf (ASG), is based in the Philippines but has cells in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and beyond. ASG’s roots can be traced back to the more radical members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).²⁸ The MNLF is a separatist organization of the Philippines that had advocated for an independent and/or autonomous region for the Muslim Moro minority in the Philippines. MNLF had previously fought with the Filipino government over the right to autonomy until 1996 when the Philippine Government agreed to create the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Since then, the MNLF has acted as a political organization rather than an armed secessionist organization.²⁹

However, more radical elements of the MNLF would found the ASG in the 1990s. With the ASG’s commitment to a truly independent Islamic State under Fundamentalist Islamic Principles, it refused to work with the MNLF. The ASG would be responsible for both the 2004 Superferry 14 Bombing, the deadliest in Filipino history, and the 2016 Davao City Bombing that killed dozens of people.³⁰ The ASG has also resorted to kidnappings, assassinations, and hostage-taking across the region. The organization developed open ties with the Islamic State in the 2010s, massively opening up its funding and operational capabilities. The ASG’s most notorious action occurred in 2017 when alongside the IS and Maute Group, conducted a fierce 5-month-long urban battle with the Filipino Armed Services and National Police in the Siege of Marawi. This fierce battle would display the strength of the ASG, being able to hold off Filipino forces for months in fierce resistance despite ultimately losing the city and suffering significant losses to the Filipino government.³¹

The high level of operations capability and funding due to their connections with worldwide terrorist organizations like the Islamic State has made it the most significant threat in the region.³² While the JI is facing a decline due to harsh crackdowns by governments and limited access to funding, the ASG remains a major threat in the region.

²⁸National Counterterrorism Center. "Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)." Counter Terrorism Guide, Jan. 2014, www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/abu_sayyaf.html.


²⁹Center for International Security and Cooperation. "MMP: Moro National Liberation Front." Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies., May 2019, cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/moro-national-liberation-front.

³⁰Center for International Security and Cooperation. "MMP: Abu Sayyaf Group." Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies., Feb. 2022, cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/abu-sayyaf-group.

³¹ Franco, Joseph. "Philippines: Addressing Islamist Militancy after the Battle for Marawi." International Crisis Group, 17 July 2018, www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/philippines-addressing-islamist-militancy-after-battle-marawi.

³² Smith, Samuel A. "Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah." International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), 2015. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09456>.

Figure 3. ASG Attack Type



Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), based in Indonesia has conducted operations across the region. JI has its roots within the now-defunct separatist group, Darul Islam (DI). DI was founded in 1942 with the express goal of creating an Islamic State under Shariah Law in Indonesia, which went against the secular vision of President Sukarno of Indonesia following the Indonesian National Revolution that created an independent secular Indonesia.³³ DI controlled significant parts of Indonesia including West Java, Sulawesi, and Aceh in the 1950s when Indonesia was still unstable. However in 1962, following major victories by Sukarno's centralized government of "Guided Democracy" DI was disbanded, with many of its members going underground to engage in smaller anti-government activities in Indonesia.³⁴

Based on this foundation, JI would become active in the region following the end of Suharto's "New Order" Regime in Indonesia. JI has been shown to be committed to the idea of religious jihad and the creation of an Islamic State in the Malay Archipelago. It has shown a strong affinity towards Wahabism and Salafism, and JI's connections with Al-Qaeda have only furthered its reputation as a dangerous radical Islamic organization.

JI would be responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings that killed 202 people. The attack was a coordinated use of various bombs near tourist areas frequented by Westerners, highlighting the

³³ Australian Government. "Jemaah Islamiyah." Australian National Security, 9 Apr. 2022, [www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations/jemaah-islamiyah-\(ji\)#:~:text=JI%20seeks%20to%20revive%20a,in%20the%201950s%20and%201960s](http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations/jemaah-islamiyah-(ji)#:~:text=JI%20seeks%20to%20revive%20a,in%20the%201950s%20and%201960s).

³⁴ Apipudin. "Daud Beureu'eh and The Darul Islam Rebellion in Aceh." *Buletin Al-Turas*, vol. 22, no. 1, 2016, <https://doi.org/10.15408/bat.v22i1.7221>.

organization's targeting of the West as part of their operations.³⁵ JI would conduct further, but smaller operations throughout Southeast Asia through its cells in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. However, JI's power has been steadily declining with most of its leaders having been imprisoned and/or killed and Indonesian counter-terrorism operations cracking down on JI's operations.³⁶

Prior International and National Action

With the major threat that terrorism poses to the nations in Southeast Asia, significant efforts have been made both internationally and nationally to combat terrorism. With the multinational aspect of terrorism, ASEAN has developed several agreements to facilitate further cooperation between members to effectively combat terrorism in the region. In 2013, the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism (ACCT) went into effect for all ASEAN member states. The ACCT fostered cooperation between ASEAN member states in combatting terrorism in the region, particularly regarding jurisdiction between national boundaries and improving counter-terrorism capability building via cooperation.³⁷ Since this monumental convention was signed, ASEAN has further developed multiple plans of action in combatting terrorism in the region, such as the ASEAN Comprehensive Plan Of Action On Counter Terrorism (2017) which further sought to improve counter-terrorism capabilities through multilateral cooperation while also tackling the root causes of terrorist activity such as poor socio-economic conditions.³⁸

National governments have also worked to develop their counter-terrorism abilities. The Philippines enacted anti-terrorism legislation in 2020 that removed barriers to investigating and charging potential terrorist groups. Furthermore, the Philippine Navy has continued to conduct joint Naval patrols with Indonesia and Malaysia since 2017.³⁹ The Indonesian National Police's operations have found significant success, conducting operations that have led to the arrest of several key leaders of terrorist organizations. Their Counter-terrorism unit (Detachment 88) is one of the best counter-terrorism units in the region.⁴⁰

Conclusion

Southeast Asia faces a monumental security challenge in the form of these terrorist organizations. These organizations threaten the safety, economic well-being, and stability of the nations in the Southeast Asian Region, with little regard to national boundaries or the rule of law.

³⁵National Museum of Australia. "Bali Bombings." 9 Oct. 2023, www.nma.gov.au/defining-moments/resources/bali-bombings.

³⁶ Smith, Samuel A. "Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah." International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), 2015. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09456>.

³⁷Association of Southeast Asian Nations. "ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism." January 13, 2007. asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ACCT.pdf.

³⁸Association of Southeast Asian Nations. "ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter Terrorism." September 20, 2017. asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ACPoA-on-CT-Adopted-by-11th-AMMTC.pdf.

³⁹ U.S Department of State. "Country Reports on Terrorism 2020: Philippines." Bureau of Counterterrorism, 16 Dec. 2021, www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/philippines__trashed/#:~:text=Overview%.

⁴⁰United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "Indonesia: Terrorism Prevention." www.unodc.org/indonesia/en/issues/terrorism-prevention.html. Accessed 20 Nov. 2023.

When developing solutions, delegates must consider the root causes of terrorism while also considering the most effective ways to combat terrorism as it exists in the present day. Southeast Asia's unique situation where maritime terrorism is just as prevalent as land-based terrorism necessitates the creation of unique and creative solutions to address the complexities of the vast terrorist networks that exist within the region. Most of all, delegates must consider how to effectively foster cooperation among nations, with the inherent multinational traits of this issue, regional cooperation will be a necessity to ensure sustainable and effective long-term solutions to the security challenges facing the region.

Questions to Consider

- 1) Is your country significantly affected by terrorism? If so how has it made efforts to combat terrorist activity in the past?
- 2) What are the root causes of terrorism in a society and how can policy work to eliminate these root causes?
- 3) When facing a multinational threat, where jurisdiction often shifts rapidly, how can nations ensure effective counter-terrorism operations?
- 4) What are the potential economic implications that the presence of terrorism in the region has for your nation?
- 5) How can international organizations work to foster effective counter-terrorism operations and policy between nations?

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